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Afton Titus*  Domestic Revenue Mobilizaton through 
 Corporate Income Tax in an East African
 Developing Country Context
The laudable objective of making the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a 
reality requires the targeted use of financial resources. It has become imperative for 
governments to raise such financial resources through mechanisms that facilitate 
the domestic mobilization of revenues. This paper argues that in an African 
developing country context, corporate income tax represents the most effective 
means by which governments may raise the required funds. Corporate income 
tax remains an important source of revenue for African countries. This paper 
further proposes: (i) the design of the essential features of a corporate income tax 
system that properly accounts for the economy within which it is to operate;(ii) the 
appropriate policy decisions that are to be made to achieve specified government 
objectives; and (iii) the administrative capacity challenges that must be addressed 
to ensure its effective implementation. In so doing, it is envisaged that the SDGs 
may become an achievable goal for developing countries, rather than a mere hope.
L’entreprise louable de faire des objectifs de développement durable (ODD) 
une réalité nécessite une utilisation ciblée de ressources financières. Il est 
devenu impératif pour les gouvernements de lever ces ressources financières 
par le biais de mécanismes qui facilitent la mobilisation nationale des revenus. 
Cet article soutient que dans le contexte des pays africains en développement, 
l’impôt sur les sociétés représente le moyen le plus efficace pour permettre aux 
gouvernements de réunir les fonds nécessaires. L’impôt sur les sociétés reste 
une source importante de revenus pour les pays africains. Ce document propose 
en outre : (i) la conception des caractéristiques essentielles d’un système d’impôt 
sur les sociétés qui tienne correctement compte de l’économie dans laquelle il 
doit fonctionner; (ii) les décisions politiques appropriées qui doivent être prises 
pour atteindre les objectifs gouvernementaux spécifiés; et (iii) les défis de capacité 
administrative qui doivent être relevés pour assurer sa mise en œuvre efficace. Ce 
faisant, il est envisagé que les ODD puissent devenir réalisables pour les pays en 
développement, plutôt qu’un simple espoir.
* Associate Professor in Commercial Law, University of Cape Town.
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Introduction
Global trade has increased, the world is more interconnected than ever 
before, and the number of places on the planet that are truly remote is 
growing smaller every day. However, developing countries still face 
significant challenges in taking advantage of these global developments. 
In recognition of these challenges, the United Nations in 2015 adopted 
a programme that identified seventeen Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). If realized, the gap between the developed and the developing 
world would drastically reduce. 
Setting aside the idealism attached to the SDGs, implementation and 
achievement of the SDGs require significant financial resources. It was 
noted at the Addis Ababa Financing for Development Conference in 2015 
that the achievement of the SDGs would need a substantial increase in 
financial resources, particularly revenues that have been domestically 
mobilized.1 
To understand how this may be done, it is necessary to place the SDGs 
in the context of a developing country faced with the (perhaps uphill) task 
1. United Nations, “Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference 
on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda), 69/313” (2015), online (pdf): 
<sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2051AAAA_Outcome.pdf> [perma.cc/B4WX-
NQWF].
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of realizing its SDGs. In doing so, the author is cognizant of the fact that 
the term “developing country” is an amorphous one. As such, the author 
has identified a particular African developing country context that would 
be appropriate for this discussion—that of the East African Federation.
The East African Federation is not yet in existence, but is a political 
federation that the Partner States making up the East African Community 
(EAC) aim to form in the near future. This East African Federation 
provides a suitable test jurisdiction for evaluating the best way for 
an African developing country to approach domestically mobilizing 
revenues to realize its SDGs. The East African Federation is a suitable 
context, despite its current non-existence, because it provides a clean slate 
by which policy proposals may be made without the hindrance of already 
embedded policy decisions that may distort the projected outcomes of 
policy-related research.   
Accordingly, this paper argues that the corporate income tax system 
is an appropriate vehicle for increasing  financial resources to enable the 
East African Federation to meet its SDGs. It has been recognized that 
corporate income tax continues to play a key role in the revenue-raising 
ability of African developing countries, and this would be true for the East 
African Federation as well.2 Given the importance of a suitably designed 
corporate income tax system to African developing countries in general, 
this paper joins a broader conversation about the tax policy issues facing 
African developing countries today. 
I. Methodology
This paper argues that the corporate income tax system is a fitting 
mechanism for  the East African Federation to increase financial resources 
and  finance government expenditure on plans to meet its SDGs. Focus is 
placed on corporate income tax for the following reasons:
(a) Corporate income tax continues to be the most important revenue-
raising tool available to African governments.3 It is therefore more 
likely to raise the required funds than other taxes.
(b) Corporate income tax is a flexible mechanism for meeting myriad 
government policy objectives in a cost-effective manner.4
(c) From an administrative perspective, it is much easier for a government 
to effectively tax corporates than individuals. This is because record-
2. Anne W Oguttu, “Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Africa—Part 1: What Should Africa’s 
Response Be to the OECD BEPS Action Plan?” (2015) 48:3 Comp & Intl LJ  Afr 516 at 526.
3. Ibid.
4. Mark B Smith, “Chapter 1: Introduction” in The Taxing Road to Sustainable Growth, Resource 
Productivity and Corporate Taxation (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2013) at 1.4. 
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keeping of corporates is better than that of individuals, and it is easier 
to locate and track corporates than individuals.5 
(d) Since taxation is as much a political imperative as it is an economic 
one, the taxation of corporates in a manner that is seen to be effective 
would tie into the populist narrative that corporations should pay their 
“fair share of taxes.”6 This would allow the East African Federation 
to gain favour with the general population, and, in so doing, lend 
credibility and legitimacy to its plan to finance SDG-building through 
corporate income tax. 
Moreover, a study conducted on domestic revenue mobilization and 
the tax capacity, effort and gaps of a range of countries,7 indicates that a 
country’s ability to raise revenue depends on the following three factors:
(a) The composition of the country’s economy;
(b) The policy choices made by the country; and
(c) The administrative capacity of the country.8
Accordingly, this paper follows a similar order. It details the EAC 
context by setting out the corporate income tax positions of the EAC 
Partner States, while also discussing the relevant drivers of the economy 
in the East African region. This context is followed by a proposal of the 
policy choices that the East African Federation may make in designing 
a corporate income tax system that could assist in raising the financial 
resources required to meet its SDG targets. Next, the administrative 
capacity challenges facing the East African Federation are considered, and 
proposals are made as to how some of these may be addressed. 
II. Corporate Income Tax Design
1. The East African Community context 
Three of the EAC Partner States have some of the highest economic 
growth rates in the East African region—Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania—
while others exhibit some of the lowest—South Sudan and Burundi.9 
5. Richard M Bird, “Why Tax Corporations?” (2002) 56 Bull Intl Taxation 194 at 199.
6. John Schoen, “Do Companies Pay  “Fair Share”? Depends Whom You Ask” CNBC (21 
September 2014), online: <www.cnbc.com/2014/09/21/axes-do-companies-pay-their-fair-share-of-
taxes-depends-how-you-ask.html> [perma.cc/CJ3B-ZF46].
7. Graham Glenday, Ipchita Bharali & Ziyuan Wang, “Enhancing Domestic Revenues: Constraints 
and Opportunities—A cross country comparative study of tax capacity, effort and gaps” (2019), online 
(pdf): Centre for Policy Impact in Global Health <centerforpolicyimpact.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/18/2019/04/CPIGH-Report_Tax-report_Enhancing-Domestic-Revenues__April-2019_FINAL.
pdf> [perma.cc/TM5B-9C5Y]. 
8. Ibid at 11.
9. “East Africa Economic Outlook 2019” (2019) at 2, online (pdf): African Development Bank 
Group <www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/REO_2019_-_
East_Africa_.pdf> [perma.cc/8TMV-9476].
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The main drivers for the strong economic growth in Kenya, Rwanda 
and Tanzania are the service and agricultural sectors.10 Conversely, the 
weak economic growth in Burundi and South Sudan is attributed to the 
continuing political instability in the two countries.11 The extractive 
industry also plays a significant role in the EAC Partner States, including 
oil extraction in South Sudan and the recent discovery of natural gas and 
oil in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.12 A further important element of the 
EAC structural economic composition is the large informal sector in the 
East African region, which plays a significant part in securing employment 
opportunities for the youth in the region.13 In terms of economic risks 
for the EAC, it is important to note the rising debt exposure that EAC 
Partner States, such as Kenya, Tanzania and South Sudan, are undertaking 
with respect to the finance provided to them by China.14 Notwithstanding 
this, the East African region has produced good performance indicators, 
with Rwanda ranked second in Africa of the 2017 World Bank’s Doing 
Business Report.15 The East African region was also the biggest recipient 
of foreign direct investment in Africa for 2017, with Kenya receiving the 
most foreign direct investment projects.16
Given this understanding of the structural composition of the economy 
in the EAC, it is useful to also analyze the manner in which the six Partner 
States of the EAC tax corporate profits before considering a proposal 
designed for the East African Federation. All six Partner States employ 
the classic corporate income system in taxing corporate profits. The key 
element of the classical corporate income tax system, as initially described 
by Van den Tempel,17 is the tax treatment of companies as separate legal 
entities, and the economic double taxation of dividends in the hands of 
the companies and shareholders.18 Table 1 below indicates the budgetary 
performance of this tax in the six Partner States for three financial years: 
2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18.
10. Ibid at 1.
11. Ibid at 5.
12. Ibid at 2.
13. Ibid at 16.
14. Ibid at 8. 
15. Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunity for All, 14th ed (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017) 
at 7.
16. “Turning Tides: EY Attractiveness Program Africa” (2018) at 16, online (pdf): Ernst & Young 
<assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_za/topics/attractiveness/ey-turning-tides-2018.pdf> 
[perma.cc/XP8J-RYE9].
17. AJ Van den Tempel, Corporation Tax and Individual Income Tax in the European Communities 
(Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1970).
18. Sijbren Cnossen, “Corporation Taxes in the European Union: Slowly Moving Toward 
Comprehensive Business Income Taxation?” (2017) 25:3 Intl Tax & Public Finance 808 at 820.
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*Author’s own calculations based on country budget information. Budget information for Burundi is 
not currently available. 
As Table 1 indicates, corporate income tax is more important to some 
Partner States (such as Kenya) than others (such as Uganda). In terms 
of trends, the collection of this tax has increased over the three-year 
period in all Partner States (aside from South Sudan and Tanzania, which 
both saw a slight dip in collections in the 2018/2019 fiscal year). This 
trend of increasing collections is interesting because both Rwanda and 
Kenya introduced corporate tax holidays over the 2015-2018 period as a 
mechanism to encourage foreign direct investment.19 Rwanda has seen a 
substantial increase in its collections over the three-year period. 
The corporate income tax’s performance varied across the other 
Partner States over the period. Despite the variance in performance, Table 
1 indicates that corporate tax collection is an important source of revenue 
across the EAC, as is the case in the rest of Africa.20
In terms of the collection of taxes, it has been noted that governments 
should collect at fifteen per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) to 
19. See Law Nº 006/2021 of 05/02/2021 on Investment Promotion And Facilitation (Rwanda), 
Annex item I; Export Processing Zones Act, 1990 (Kenya), c 517, s 29.
20. Oguttu, supra note 2 at 526.
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adequately finance government functions.21 However, in terms of Table 2 
below, aside from Kenya, all of the EAC Partner States have tax-to-GDP 
ratios below fifteen per cent. In terms of the relation of these ratios to more 
global averages, France has the highest tax-to-GDP ratio of the OECD 
countries at 46.1 per cent while Mexico has the lowest at 16.1 per cent.22 
Table 2:  Tax-to-GDP Ratio for East African Community Partner States*  
and selected OECD States**











* Source: World Bank Data  **Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2019
According to the above table, Kenya has the highest tax-to-GDP ratio 
of 15.7 per cent, while Tanzania has the lowest (in terms of reportable 
data) of 11.6 per cent. This means that most of the EAC Partner States 
are not collecting enough taxes to properly sustain government functions. 
This has exacerbated the high debt exposure of the EAC Partner States as 
mentioned earlier in this paper as the EAC Partner States use debt to fund 
government expenditure. 
The collection of corporate tax in the EAC Partner States must also 
be considered against the general fiscal budget of the Partner States. 
All of the Partner States have recorded a fiscal deficit for the 2018/2019 
21. “East Coast Economic Outlook 2019,” supra note 9 at 12.
22. OECD, Revenue Statistics 2019 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019) at 19. 
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financial year. The deficits are quite dire, but vary across Partner States, 
with Kenya reflecting a deficit of 5.6 per cent of GDP,23 while at the lower 
end of the scale, Tanzania reflected a deficit of 2.3 per cent of GDP for the 
same period.24 Moreover, aside from Rwanda25 and Uganda,26 most of the 
Partner States failed to meet their budgeted targets for the collection of 
income tax.27 As a result, Partner States like Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda 
have prioritized in their budget announcements the improvement of the tax 
administration in their respective countries.28  
Bearing this context in mind, the corporate tax base of the six Partner 
States will now be analyzed. All six Partner States employ the classical 
corporate income tax system with corporate profits being taxed in the 
hands of the corporate, while the distributed profits are taxed in the hands 
of the shareholders as dividends. The taxable income of companies is the 
result of reducing income by allowable deductions. 
In terms of the definition of income, Kenya,29 Rwanda,30 Tanzania31 and 
Uganda32 have a comprehensive definition of income in their respective 
income tax legislation. The definition of business profits includes rental 
income and investment income, with a long list of specifically included 
23. Kenya, Budget Statement FY2019/20, Creating Jobs, Transforming Lives—Harnessing the ‘Big 
Four’ Plan  (2019) at 9, online (pdf): <www.treasury.go.ke/component/jdownloads/send/201-2019-
2020/1442-budget-statement-for-fy-2019-20-final.html> [perma.cc/99HM-ZTB5] [Kenya Budget 
Statement].
24. Tanzania, Speech by the Minister for Finance and Planning, Hon. Dr. Philip I. Mpango (MP), 
Presenting to the National Assembly, the Estimates of Government Revenue and Expenditure for 
2019/20 (13 June 2019) at para 32, online (pdf): <gbt.go.tz/files/documents/BudgetSpeech2019-En.
pdf> [perma.cc/M2WL-KWSP] [Tanzania Budget Speech]. 
25. Rwanda, Budget Speech Financial Year 2019/20: Transforming lives through Industrialization 
and Job Creation for Shared Prosperity (June 2019) at para 16, online (pdf): <www.tralac.org/
documents/resources/by-country/rwanda/2862-rwanda-budget-speech-2019-20/file.html> [perma.
cc/39D5-87FS] [Rwanda Budget Speech]. 
26. Uganda, Budget Speech FY2019/20: Industrialization for Job Creation and Shared Prosperity 
(June 2019) at para 23, online (pdf): <budget.go.ug/content/budget-speech-7> [perma.cc/M2WL-
KWSP] [Uganda Budget Speech].
27. See Kenya, 2019 Budget Review and Outlook Paper (September 2019) at 15, online (pdf): 
<https://www.treasury.go.ke/component/jdownloads/send/201-2019-2020/1303-the-fiscal-budget-
for-the-financial-year-2019-20.html>; Tanzania Budget Speech, supra note 24, at para 14; South 
Sudan, FY: 2019/2020 Approved Budget Book (19 December 2019) at ii, online (pdf): <www.
mofep-grss.org/docs/fy-2019-2020-approved-budget-book> [perma.cc/V7UD-R7XP]; Budgetary 
information for Burundi is not available. 
28. Kenya Budget Statement, supra note 23 at 8; Tanzania Budget Speech, supra note 24 at paras 
33-34; Uganda Budget Speech, supra note 26 at paras 111-112.
29. Income Tax Act, 1973, Chapter 470 (Kenya), s 3(2).
30. Law No.16/2018 of 13 April 2018 Establishing Taxes on Income (Rwanda), arts 19, 35, 40–43.
31. Income Tax Act, 2004 as amended, c 332 (Tanzania), ss 6–9.
32. Income Tax Act, 1997, c 340 of the Laws of Uganda (Uganda), ss 17–20.
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amounts.33 Having said that, the definition of income is rather minimal in 
the fiscal legislation of Burundi34 and South Sudan.35 
The general rule for the deductions is similar across Kenya,36 Tanzania37 
and Uganda,38 with the requirements for an expenditure or loss to have 
been incurred in the production of income. Rwanda39 and Burundi,40 
however, require a more methodical approach to deductions, likely with a 
view to identify real economic activity. These Partner States require that 
the expenditure must be incurred for purposes related to business, must 
result in the reduction of net assets, must correspond to real expenditure, 
and must be related to the particular financial year. In terms of specific 
deductions, a deduction for research and development related expenditure 
is allowed in Burundi,41 Kenya,42 Rwanda,43 Tanzania44 and Uganda.45 
Moreover, while all six Partner States allow for capital allowances and 
depreciation deductions, the rates and capital projects differ across the 
Partner States. Possible tax leakages may arise in this area as many of 
the Partner States provide capital allowances which may be considered 
excessive. For instance, all the Partner States except for Burundi and 
South Sudan routinely provide for initial capital allowance rates of 50%46 
while Kenya provides for a 150% capital allowance for the construction 
of bulk storage and handling facilities for supporting the Standard Gauge 
railway operations, provided that certain conditions are met.47
A further area for possible tax leakage lies in the rules for the carry 
forward of losses across the Partner States. An indefinite carry forward of 
33. The list of specifically included amounts does not appear to hamper the interpretation of income 
in the EAC Partner States. For instance, see Heritage Oil and Gas Limited v Uganda Revenue Authority 
[2011] UGTAT 6 and Kenya Revenue Authority v Yaya Towers Limited (2016) eKLR.
34. Law No. 1/02 of 24 January 2013 Regarding Income Taxes,  (Loi No. 01/02 Du 24 Janvier 2013 
Relative Aux Impots Sur Les Revenus), as amended (Burundi), art 37. This legislation is only available 
in French, online (pdf) <www.assemblee.bi> [perma.cc/MG94-C52E].
35. Taxation Act, Statutes of South Sudan 2009, s 64. 
36. Supra note 29, s 15(1). 
37. Supra note 31, s 11(2). 
38. Supra note 32, s 22(1). 
39. Supra note 30, art 25. 
40. Supra note 34 at art 53.
41. Ibid, art 68.
42. Supra note 29, s 15(2)(n). 
43. Supra note 30, art 30.
44. Supra note 31, s 15(1). 
45. Supra note 32, s 32(1). 
46. Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2020 (Kenya), Second Schedule; Law Nº 006/2021 of 05/02/2021 on 
Investment Promotion And Facilitation (Rwanda), Annex item XX; supra note 31 at Third Schedule; 
supra note 32, s 28(1).
47. Supra note 29, s 24E; Business Laws (Amendment) Act, 2020 (Kenya), s 11.
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losses is allowed in Tanzania48 and Uganda.49 On the other hand, Burundi,50 
Kenya (in all other industries),51 Rwanda52 and South Sudan53 place a 
restriction on the number of years for which a loss may be carried forward. 
While the EAC region did undergo a tax rate harmonization to thirty 
per cent after the production of a report on tax harmonization in the region 
some years back,54 this tax rate harmonization is more of an illusion than a 
reality. Now, the only Partner State that does not offer a special corporate 
income tax rate for an identified sector or taxpayer is Uganda. All the other 
Partner States have made significant reductions in the standard corporate 
income tax rate, with South Sudan’s55 reduced rate sinking to ten per cent 
for certain sectors. 
However, the tax incentives offered by most Partner States have the 
effect of reducing the varying tax rates to relative insignificance. The only 
Partner State that does not offer corporate income tax holidays is South 
Sudan, and that is because it is embroiled in political conflict. Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania all offer exemptions from the 
payment of corporate tax. Some offer exemptions for five years and others 
for ten years, as discussed further in Part II.2.b below. These tax incentives 
are all offered with the aim of attracting foreign direct investment, and in 
the hopes of differentiating themselves from other EAC Partner States. 
While the EAC region has performed well in terms of attracting more 
foreign direct investment than other countries in Africa, it is nonetheless 
questionable whether the EAC would not have won such investment 
without the deep cuts into the corporate tax the Partner States could have 
collected.
For some companies, corporate tax is not a cost they have to bear 
when doing business in the EAC Partner States. As such, in designing its 
corporate income tax system, the East African Federation should consider 
the role of tax incentives when determining the objectives it hopes to 
achieve with its corporate income tax. The next part will discuss this 
48. No provisions restricting the carry forward of losses in the Income Tax Act (Tanzania), see supra 
note 31, s 19. 
49. Supra note 32, s 38. 
50. Supra note 34, art 75.
51. Supra note 29, s 15(4).
52. Supra note 30, art 32.
53. Supra note 35, s 78(2).
54. Hans-Goerg Petersen, ed, Tax Systems and Tax Harmonisation in the East African Community 
(EAC): Report for the EAC/GTZ Program “Support to the EAC Integration Process (Potsdam: 
University of Potsdam 2010).
55. Supra note 35 at Second Schedule.
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aspect of the design of a corporate income tax system for the East African 
Federation, along with other relevant factors for the East African context. 
2. Policy choices
Tax policy cannot be conceived in a vacuum. For tax policy to be effective, 
it is necessary to take into account the social, economic and political 
realities of the country in which the policy is to operate.56 From an East 
African Federation perspective, therefore, it is important for corporate 
income tax policies to be formulated while bearing in mind the reality in 
which the policies are to operate. 
To do this, it is important to identify what the East African Federation 
hopes to achieve from a corporate income tax. The critical objective of the 
corporate income tax in the East African Federation would be to increase 
government revenues. Corporate income tax is an amenable policy tool 
for achieving this revenue-raising aim. Bowler Smith notes that corporate 
income tax as a regulatory instrument is cost-effective, flexible and 
efficient.57 Corporate income tax is especially effective in promoting the 
more efficient use of resources.58 However, as a system, the corporate 
income tax does have some drawbacks. These drawbacks include 
questions about the fairness of corporate income tax in taxing the income 
from capital, both in the hands of the company and the shareholder,59 and 
the manner in which the complexity of the corporate income tax system 
distorts investment decisions.60
In practical terms, however, the great disparity between the rates of 
corporate income tax to total tax across the Partner States indicates that 
corporate income tax is a potential growth factor on which the East African 
Federation should focus. Moreover, the fact that all of the Partner States 
are presently in dire budget deficits—some are critical—adds impetus 
to the need to realize the growth potential of corporate income tax. It is 
therefore key that the East African Federation take measures to broaden 
the tax base of corporate income tax. This could be done by evaluating 
the EU’s proposed common consolidated corporate tax base and is further 
discussed under part II.2.a (EU’s proposed CCCTB). 
The second manner in which the corporate income tax could raise 
more revenue is by ensuring that the East African Federation is competitive 
56. Helen Bullock, Juliet Mountford & Rebecca Stanley, Better Policy-Making (London: Centre for 
Management and Policy Studies, 2001).
57. M Bowler Smith, “Chapter 3: Corporate Tax Objectives” in The Taxing Road to Sustainable 
Growth, Resource Productivity and Corporate Taxation” (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2013).
58. Ibid. 
59. David L Weimer, “A Better Corporate Tax?” (2002) 21:4 J Policy Analysis & Management 693.
60. Ibid.
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within the global market. Like many other developing countries, the East 
African Federation would seek to attract foreign direct investment. Tax 
incentives are typically used to fulfill this function, and it is therefore 
key for the East African Federation to determine whether it will use such 
mechanisms and how best to use them to suit the East African context. 
This will be further discussed under part II.2.b (Tax incentives).
A third manner of raising more corporate income tax is to reduce 
the large informal sector in the East African region. The informal sector 
here means “all economic activity—and income earned from it—that 
circumvent government regulation, taxation or observation.”61 The manner 
in which the East African Federation may reduce the informal sector is 
discussed under part II.2.c.
a. Broaden the corporate income tax base
The European Union’s proposed CCCTB
The idea of establishing a common corporate income tax base in the EU 
has been the subject of debate for decades. It has been recognized that 
the corporate income tax systems across Member States vary greatly, and 
that great costs to taxpayers are involved in conducting cross-border trade 
within the EU.62
The idea of developing a meaningful commonality in the corporate tax 
base in the EU was first posited in 1992 by the Committee of Independent 
Experts in Company Taxation (the Ruding Committee),63 followed by 
further action taken in 1999 through the Council inviting the Commission 
to present a study on company taxation in the EU.64 In its most recent 
attempt at corporate tax commonality, the Commission first tabled its 
formal proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in 2011. 
It proved too difficult to obtain the necessary Member State consensus to 
pass the proposal, and the proposal was later replaced with a relaunched 
two-part proposal in 2016. The first part of this proposal envisages a 
directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base65 (CCTB proposal) to be later 
61. Andreas Buehn, Roberto Dell’Anno & Friedrich Schneider, “Exploring the Dark Side of Tax 
Policy: An Analysis of the Interactions between Fiscal Illusion and the Shadow Economy” (2018) 54:4 
Empirical Economics 1609 at 1611.
62. Marjaana Helminen, EU Tax Law—Direct Taxation  (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2018) at 4.4.1.
63. Jan van de Streek, “Chapter 11: A Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax Base (C(C)CTB)” 
in Peter J Wattèl, Otto Marres and Hein Vermeulen, eds, Terra/Wattel—European Tax Law, 7th ed 
(Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2018) at 29.
64. Ibid.
65. Proposal for a directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB), COM(2016)685 final 
[CCTB Proposal].
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followed by a directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB proposal).66
The CCTB/CCCTB proposals have two general policy objectives: 
encouraging growth and investment within the EU and making the 
corporate income tax more fair within the EU.67 To meet the first policy 
objective, Van de Streek points to several measures within the CCTB/
CCCTB proposals, including: the move to harmonize the tax base, the 
super deduction for research and development for start-up companies, and 
the allowance for corporate equity.68 The second objective is met through 
the introduction of measures that counter cross-border tax avoidance, 
including the mandatory application of the CCTB/CCCTB proposals to 
groups of companies with consolidated global turnover of more than €750 
million,69 and the proposed sharing mechanism in  the CCCTB proposal.70
The essence of the proposal is that the taxable income of companies 
and permanent establishments within the EU is to be determined 
according to uniform rules applied across the Member States. Moreover, 
the financial performance of group companies is to be consolidated. Such 
consolidated taxable income is to be apportioned amongst the group 
member companies according to an apportionment formula comprised 
of the production factors, including sales, labour and capital. The taxable 
income apportioned to each member of the group is to be subject to tax 
at the rate determined by the Member State in which the group member 
companies are operating. On a practical level, this development would 
result in only one tax return being filed by the parent company of the group 
on behalf of the entire group. This tax return would be filed in the Member 
State in which the parent company is resident.
Determining the tax base of companies and permanent establishments 
under the CCTB proposal involves determining revenues, excluding 
exempt revenue, followed by the deduction of expenses.71 “Revenues” is 
broadly defined in article 4(5) and includes: monetary or non-monetary 
proceeds derived from a sale or any other transaction (net of value added 
tax and other taxes); proceeds from the disposal of rights and assets; 
interest; dividends and other profit distributions; proceeds of liquidations; 
royalties; gifts received and ex gratia payments. Revenues does not, 
66. Proposal for a directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2016) 
683 final [CCCTB Proposal]. 
67. Supra note 65, preamble at para 2.
68. Supra note 63 at 432.
69. Ibid at 434-435.
70. CCCTB Proposal, supra note 66 at 2-4.
71. CCTB Proposal, supra note 65, art 7.
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however, include receipts arising from the repayment of a debt or the 
raising of equity.72 Despite its inclusion in revenues, income which is to 
be exempted includes: the profits of foreign permanent establishments; the 
proceeds from the disposal of shares where the taxpayer has maintained 
a minimum holding of ten per cent in the shareholding or voting rights 
of the company during the twelve months preceding the disposal; profit 
distributions from companies where the taxpayer has a minimum holding 
of ten per cent in the shareholding or of the voting rights of the distributing 
company for twelve consecutive months; proceeds from the disposal of 
pooled assets; and subsidies directly related to the acquisition, construction 
or improvement of depreciable assets.73 Moreover, while interest and 
royalty income are to be subject to tax, the withholding tax paid on such 
receipts are to be credited.74 
Article 9 of the CCTB Proposal allows for the deduction of expenses 
to the extent that they are directly incurred in the business interest of the 
taxpayer. Such deductible expenses may include research and development 
costs and also costs arising from the raising of debt or equity for the 
purpose of business.75 The term “expenses” is further defined in article 
4(6) as meaning: 
decreases in net equity of the company during the accounting period in 
the form of outflows or a reduction in the value of assets or in the form 
of a recognition or increase in the value of liabilities, other than those 
related to monetary or non-monetary distributions to shareholders or 
equity owners in their capacity as such.
The CCTB Proposal allows for the super-deduction of research and 
development costs by way of an additional deduction of fifty per cent of 
such costs up to a maximum of €20 million and a further twenty-five per 
cent deduction for costs over €20 million.76 
The CCTB Proposal also includes a special research and development 
deduction for “small starting companies.”77 In addition to the deduction 
of research and development costs in full under article 9(2), article 9(3) 
allows companies to deduct a further one hundred per cent of their research 
and development costs if the following conditions are met: the company 
is unlisted with fewer than 50 employees; it has an annual turnover and/
72. Ibid, art 4(5).
73. Ibid, art 8.
74. Ibid, art 55.
75. Ibid, art 9(2).
76. Ibid, art 9(3).
77. Ibid at 10. 
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or annual balance sheet total that is less than €10 million; it is not the 
result of a merger; it has been registered for no longer than five years or its 
economic activity has endured for a period of five years or less; and it has 
no associated enterprises.78
The CCTB also attempts to work towards the elimination of the 
debt-equity bias through the allowance for growth and investment. This 
elimination allows for the cost of equity to be deductible in instances of 
an incremental increase in equity as compared to a reference point. For the 
first ten years, this reference point will be the first day of the first year of 
the application of the CCTB rules.79 After ten years, the reference year is 
annually moved forward one year.80 The CCTB also provides that should 
there be a decrease in the equity base, an amount equal to the defined yield 
calculated in terms of article 11(5) shall become taxable. The defined yield 
shall be calculated with reference to the Euro Area ten-year government 
benchmark bond in December of the year preceding the relevant year, 
along with a risk premium increase of two percentage points.81
The CCTB continues in the calculation of the tax base by detailing a 
list of non-deductible expenses in article 12. Non-deductible items include: 
•	 profit distributions and repayments of equity or debt
•	 fifty per cent of entertainment costs (up to an amount still to be 
determined)
•	 transfers of retained earnings to an equity reserve
•	 taxes on profits and corporate tax
•	 bribes and other illegal payments
•	 fines and penalties
•	 expenses incurred in the deriving of exempt income
•	 gifts and donations
•	 capital costs related to fixed assets that are deductible elsewhere 
in the CCTB rules; and 
•	 losses of a permanent establishment situated in a third country.  
The CCTB Proposal further allows for losses to be carried forward 
indefinitely.82
The CCCTB Proposal, on the other hand, provides the rules for the 
consolidation of profits of group companies, and the allocation of such 
profits across the group members operating in different Member States 
according to the apportionment formula. Article 7(1) provides that the tax 
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid, art 11(4). 
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid, art 11(5).
82. Ibid, art 41.
166 The Dalhousie Law Journal
bases of all group members are to be added together, while article 7(2) 
states that should such consolidation result in a negative tax base, this is to 
be carried forward for set-off against a positive consolidated base. Only a 
positive consolidated tax base may be apportioned.
Such apportionment is set out in articles 28 to 42 and details the 
formulary apportionment with its three equally weighted factors of sales, 
capital and labour. The formula to determine the share of the tax base 
for a particular group member (Company A) is set out in article 28(1) as 
follows:83
In terms of the calculation of the above figures, the CCCTB Proposal 
provides special rules for the oil and extractive industry. Article 42 
states that the sales amount of the group member actually conducting 
the exploration or production of oil or gas business shall be attributed 
to the group member situated in the Member State where the business is 
conducted. Moreover, in the event that the group member conducts the 
exploration or production of oil or gas business in a third country where 
such group member does not have a permanent establishment, the sales 
amount arising from such business shall nonetheless be attributed to such 
group member.84 However, should there be no group member situated 
in the Member State where the exploration or production of oil or gas 
business is conducted, the sales amount is to be attributed to all the other 
group members in proportion to their labour and assets factors.85
Once the consolidated tax base has been apportioned in terms of 
the above formula, article 45 provides that such apportioned tax base 
is to be subject to tax according to the varying tax rates of the Member 
States involved. Administrative provisions are set out in articles 46 to 68, 
including details such as the notice to form a group and the information that 
is to be included in such notice, the obligation of the principal taxpayer to 
file the consolidated return, the information to be included in such return, 
the failure to file a tax return, and the procedures to follow should a dispute 
arise between the Member State and taxpayer.
More recently in May 2018, the Commission proposed that once 
the relevant CCCTB legislation is in place, a three per cent call rate 
should be applied to the CCCTB to bolster the EU’s own resources.86 In 
83. CCCTB Proposal, supra note 66, art 28(1).
84. Ibid, art 42.
85. Ibid, arts 38(4)-(5), 42. 
86. European Commission, EU Budget: Commission Proposes A Modern Budget for a Union that 
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March 2018, the European Parliament passed a resolution that approved 
recommendations to the CCCTB Proposal, as proposed by the Economic 
and Monetary Affairs Committee.87 These recommendations include: 
(i) The introduction of a fourth factor, the data factor, to the formulary 
apportionment;
(ii) While initially the CCCTB should be mandatory for groups of a 
certain size, this threshold should be lowered to zero over seven 
years;
(iii) The introduction of a digital permanent establishment concept;
(iv) Losses in respect of a consolidated tax base shall be carried forward 
for a period of five years;
(v) A compensation mechanism shall be introduced to weather the 
transitional sudden shock to tax revenues of Member States that 
implement the CCCTB. This mechanism is to be financed by the 
fiscal surpluses of Member States to experience gains in fiscal 
revenues. This mechanism is to remain in place for an initial period 
of seven years;
(vi) As a transitional measure, the Commission is to draft guidelines on 
how the formulary apportionment method may co-exist with other 
allocation methods employed by the non-EU States;
(vii) A dispute resolution mechanism should be put in place when the 
formulary apportionment produces a result that does not fit the 
actual economic activity;
(viii) The CCCTB should be implemented in one step.  If the Council fails 
to reach unanimous consensus on this, article 116 of the TFEU88 
should be invoked. This means that the European Parliament and 
the Council should act under the ordinary legislation procedure.89 As 
a last resort, the enhanced cooperation procedures may be used by 
Member States wishing to participate in the implementation of the 
CCCTB;
Protects, Empowers And Defends (2 May 2018).
87. European Parliament, European Parliament legislative resolution of 15 March 2018 on 
the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
(COM(2016)0683–C8-0471/2016–2016/0336(CNS)) (15 March 2018). 
88. Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), article 
116, OJEU C 326/47 (2012), EU Law IBFD.
89. The ordinary legislative procedure allows for the European Parliament and the Council to jointly 
decide on the proposals for law made by the Commission (the only body which may initiate legislative 
proposals). The vast majority of European laws are passed in this way. However, in respect of taxation, 
the special legislative procedures are to be followed which means that the European Parliament is only 
able to provide an advisory opinion on the legislative proposal while the Council, acting unanimously, 
is to make the decision whether to accept, reject or amend the Commission’s legislative proposal. 
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(ix) The CCCTB regime is to be evaluated by an interparliamentary 
conference and the European Parliament shall report its findings 
to the Commission and the Council. Moreover, five years after 
the implementation of the CCCTB, the Commission is to conduct 
an assessment of its implementation and report to the European 
Parliament and the Council;
(x) The provisions are to apply from 1 January 2020.
The recent proposed recommendations to the CCCTB Proposal 
indicate a more decisive approach than those proposed in the two-part 
CCTB/CCCTB proposals. A compensation mechanism is a novel way to 
ensure that arguments cannot be raised of a loss to revenues as a result of 
the implementation of the CCCTB. Moreover, the recommendation of the 
CCCTB to take into account the digital economy is a necessary change to 
make the CCCTB more relevant to modern reality. 
The recommendations indicate an awareness of the possibility of 
factor manipulation of the formulary apportionment by the provision 
acknowledging that the formulary apportionment method may result in an 
outcome that does not match the economic activity actually undertaken. 
To overcome this result, the amendments propose that this be resolved 
through a dispute resolution mechanism. While this proposal is not ideal 
because one would prefer that mechanisms be put in place to ensure that 
the workings of the formulary apportionment mirrors the economic reality, 
the proposed resolution of disputes via dispute resolution is a workable 
solution under the circumstances. 
Moreover, it is a prudent measure to have the CCCTB regime and its 
implementation evaluated to determine whether the policy objectives of 
the CCCTB are being achieved. Most importantly, the recommendations 
include a planned way forward in the event of the Council failing to reach 
consensus on the CCTB/CCCTB Proposals. In the author’s view, this is a 
bold step forward towards making the CCCTB a reality. 
The CCTB/CCCTB Proposals and their predecessors have been the 
subject of much criticism.90 While the recent amendments to the CCTB/
90. See e.g. Jeanette C Borg, “The Tax Treatment of Losses under the Proposed Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Directive” (2013) 41:11 Intertax 581; Maarten F De Wilde, “Tax 
Competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB Directive a Solution?” (2014) 7:1 Erasmus 
L Rev 24; Monica Erasmus-Koen, “Common Consolidated Tax Base: A Fair Share of the Tax Base?” 
(2011) 18:4 Intl Transfer Pricing J 245; Eric CCM Kemmeren, “CCCTB: Enhanced Speed Ahead 
for Improvement” (2011) 20:5 EC Tax Rev 208; Erik Röder, “Proposal for an Enhanced CCTB as 
Alternative to a CCCTB with Formulary Apportionment” (2012) 4:2 World Tax J 125; Marc Temme, 
Eduard Sporken & Rezan Okten, “Why Re-Invent the Wheel in the European Union? The Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Proposal” (2011) 18:5 Intl Transfer Pricing J 330; Edoardo 
Traversa & Charles-Albert Helleputte, “Taxation of EU-resident companies under the current CCCTB 
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CCCTB Proposals would address some of the criticisms levelled against the 
CCCTB concept, particularly the concern that the CCCTB fails to cater to 
the digital economy, some of the broader criticisms remain. These criticisms 
include that Member States will lose their tax sovereignty over corporate 
tax;91 that the formula remains unbalanced;92 that there is no compensation 
for minority shareholders of individual group companies involved in the 
consolidation;93 and the fact that multinational companies could still locate 
the formulary apportionment factors in low-tax jurisdictions.94 Moreover, 
concern has been raised that the AGI may be counter-productive in 
encouraging the raising of equity because  an additional tax liability would 
arise in the event of equity decreases.95 Spengel and others argue that a 
“pure” allowance for corporate equity would have had decreases in equity 
merely to attract a lower equity allowance rather than an additional tax 
burden.96 A detailed discussion of these concerns are beyond the scope of 
this paper, and have been discussed elsewhere.97 
Recommendations
From an East African Federation perspective, the CCCTB Proposal and 
its recommendations offer the East African Federation the opportunity to 
align and simplify the varied corporate tax bases of the Partner States. To 
do this effectively, it is advisable for the CCCTB-like system to apply to 
all companies operating within the East African Federation. 
Furthermore, the East African Federation may find the comprehensive 
definition of revenues in article 4 of the CCTB Proposal useful given that 
South Sudan, for instance, has a minimal definition of income or revenue.98 
Framework: Descriptive and Critical Approach to Selected ‘Extraterritorial’ Aspects” in Michael 
Lang, ed, Corporate Income Taxation in Europe: The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
and Third Countries (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2013); Marius Vascega & Servaas van Thiel, 
“The CCCTB Proposal: The Next Step towards Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Union” 
(2011) 51:9/10 EuroTax 379. 
91. Vascega & van Thiel, supra note 90; Maarten F de Wilde, “Chapter 2: The CCCTB Relaunch: A 
Critical Assessment and Some Suggestions for Modification” in Pasquale Pistone, ed, European Tax 
Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (Online Books: IBFD, 2018).
92. Vascega & van Thiel, supra note 90.
93. Borg, supra note 90.
94. De Wilde, supra note 91; Leon Bettendorf et al., “Corporate Tax Reform in the EU: Weighing 
Pros and Cons” (2011) at 3, online (pdf): Academia <academia.edu/1427439/Corporate_Tax_Reform_
in_the_EU_Weighing_Pros_and_Cons> [perma.cc/B3WE-Y8JW].
95. Christopher Spengel et al, “Addressing the Debt-Equity Bias within a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) – Possibilities, Impact on Effective Tax Rates and Revenue Neutrality” 
(2018) 10:2 World Tax J 165 at 171.
96. Ibid.
97. Afton Titus, “How Can the East African Community Guard Against Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting While Working Towards Deeper Integration?” (2017) 9:4 World Tax J 565.  
98. The Taxation Act (South Sudan), 2009, s 64. 
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According to section 64 of the Taxation Act in South Sudan, gross income 
means “all income earned or accrued, including, but not limited to, 
income from production, trade, financial investment, professional or other 
economic activities within the tax period.”99 These categories are broad, 
and the CCTB definition of “revenues” would clarify the exact scope of 
income that falls within the tax base.
Moreover, the CCTB Proposal’s definition of expenses in article 4 
ties in with the definition adopted in Rwanda and Burundi, which focuses 
on the objective indicators of an expense, such as the reduction of asset 
values or a decrease in net equity.100 Rwanda’s Law Establishing Taxes on 
Income, for instance, provides at article 25 that expenses may be deducted 
if the following conditions are met: the expenses are directly chargeable to 
income and are directly incurred for the purpose of business; the expenses 
are real expenses that can be substantiated with proper documentation; the 
expenses result in a decrease in net assets; and the expenses are incurred 
in the same tax year as the activities to which they relate.101
All of the Partner States already account for research and development 
deductions in full in the year in which they are incurred.102 Therefore, the 
deduction for such expenditure under the CCTB Proposal would not be 
out of place within the East African Federation. However, the extent of the 
deduction would have to be carefully considered by the Federation as to 
whether it should allow a super-deduction for research and development, 
as the CCTB Proposal has done. Given that a super-deduction has not been 
a trend in the East African region and that such a super-deduction would 
narrow the tax base (albeit in a bid to encourage research and development 
in the region), it is recommended that the East African Federation not 
incorporate a super-deduction immediately upon the implementation of 
its corporate income tax system. The East African Federation may wish to 
revisit this decision after some years once its corporate income tax system 
has been in place for a number of years.  
Having said that, there is a point of similarity between the allowances 
offered under the CCTB Proposal and Uganda’s income tax laws for 
small, start-up companies. While the CCTB Proposal offers a research and 
development super-deduction of one hundred per cent of relevant costs 
99. Ibid. 
100. Law Regarding Income Taxes (Burundi), 2013, art 53; Law Establishing Taxes on Income 
(Rwanda), 2018, art 25.
101. Law Establishing Taxes on Income (Rwanda), 2018, art 25.
102. Law Regarding Income Taxes (Burundi), 2013, art 68; Income Tax Act, 1973 (Kenya), 1973, 
s 15(2)(n); Law Establishing Taxes on Income (Rwanda), 2018, art 30; Income Tax Act (Tanzania), 
2004, s 15(1); Income Tax Act (Uganda), 1997, s 32(1). 
Domestic Revenue Mobilization through Corporate Income 171
Tax in an East African Developing Country Context
for small companies that meet the specified requirements under article 
9(3), Uganda offers a deduction of twenty-five per cent per annum for four 
years of the costs incurred in starting up a business to produce income.103 
While the CCTB Proposal deduction allows for a greater amount of 
qualifying expenditure to be deducted, Uganda’s deduction allows for a 
broader spectrum of expenditures to be deducted other than just research 
and development expenditures. To encourage the development of small 
business, it is recommended that the East African Federation incorporate 
a deduction for small, start-up companies similar to that implemented 
in Uganda. It would be more feasible to encourage the growth of small 
business in industry broadly in the East African Federation rather than just 
in the one that incurs research and development expenditures.  
The CCTB Proposal would also allow the East African Federation to 
create unity across its corporate income tax base by aligning the varying 
rates of depreciation allowed within the Partner States.104 Moreover, 
the CCTB Proposal offers the East African Federation the opportunity 
to create more symmetry across the tax treatment of debt and equity 
through its Allowance for Growth and Investment (AGI). Should the East 
African Federation implement provisions similar to the AGI in the CCTB 
Proposal, it would allow the Federation to move towards the elimination 
of the debt-equity bias in the tax treatment of interest and equity. An AGI 
may also encourage more taxpayers to incorporate companies, which 
would increase the number of taxpayers subject to corporate income tax 
in the Federation. It is therefore advisable for the East African Federation 
to consider implementing an AGI-like provision in its corporate income 
tax system. It is not recommended that the Federation follow the CCTB 
Proposal in determining that decreases in equity should result in a further 
tax liability for the taxpayer company. Such a provision would likely deter 
taxpayers from forming companies. 
In terms of the consolidation aspect proposed in the CCCTB Proposal, 
it would be particularly useful to the East African Federation because 
it would enable it to deal more effectively with situations of corporate 
failures. One of the reasons for the dismantling of a previous regional 
integration attempt in the East African region was the lack of participation 
103. Income Tax Act (Uganda), 1997, s 30.
104. There are differences in depreciation rates implemented in the Partner States. For instance, 
industrial buildings depreciate at a rate of twenty per cent per annum in Uganda (Income Tax Act 
(Uganda), 1997, Sixth Schedule, Part 1) while Rwanda and Tanzania use a rate of five per cent per 
annum (Law Establishing Taxes on Income (Rwanda), 2018, art 28; Income Tax Act (Tanzania), 2004, 
Third Schedule, item 3(6)).
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of other Partner States when a corporate failed.105 It was left to one Partner 
State, the country in which the entity was registered, to account for and 
deal with the consequences of a corporate failure. If the East African 
Federation were to implement a system similar to the CCCTB, it would 
mean that, in the event that the group realizes a loss, such loss would 
result in no tax being paid by the group. Such loss would then be allowed 
to be carried forward to the next year in a coordinated fashion until the 
group is once again profitable. It is more likely that a group would turn 
a profit at some point in the future than a single company. Therefore, the 
East African Federation would more likely be in a position to receive the 
group’s tax portion in a shorter time once the group is again profitable than 
would be the case if one Partner State were waiting for a single company 
operating within its borders to turn its losses into profits. 
It is important, however, that the carry forward of losses be limited to 
encourage the group’s return to profitability. As many of the Partner States 
already limit the carry forward of losses,106 the similar provision in the 
most recent recommendations to the CCCTB Proposal would work well 
within the East African Federation. 
The purpose of applying an apportionment-like formula in the East 
African Federation would be to allow the corporate income tax collected 
at the Federal Government level to be redistributed to the Constituent 
States (which the EAC Partner States will become once the Federation is 
formed) according to the operations conducted there by the group company 
members. Redistribution on such terms would foster more efficiency 
amongst the Constituent States because apportionment would incentivize 
Constituent States to find non-tax related reasons to encourage companies 
to operate within their province. Having said that, an apportionment based 
only on the location of group company operations may result in the lesser 
developed Constituent States being in a worse off position than their more 
developed Constituent States, as companies would be more inclined to 
operate from the more developed Constituent State. 
To avoid the least developed Constituent States from losing out on an 
allocation of the corporate income tax, it is proposed that the East African 
Federation supplement the apportionment formula with a macro-economic 
element that is tied to the GDP of the Member States, as suggested by 
105. DAK Mbogoro, “The East African Community: An Economic Analysis of the Integration 
Scheme” (1978) 8:1/2 African Rev 55 at 61.
106. Law Regarding Income Taxes (Burundi), 2013, art 75; Income Tax Act, 1973 (Kenya), 1973, s 
15(4); Law Establishing Taxes on Income (Rwanda), 2018, art 32; The Taxation Act (South Sudan), 
2009, s 78(2).
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Kellerman and others.107 A macro-economic element would address the 
need to ensure regional development through redistributing resources to 
the Constituent States who need it most. In practical terms, this means 
that a portion of the tax base calculated by an application of the CCCTB 
rules would be retained and then redistributed to all Constituent States, 
irrespective of whether such Constituent State has any tie to the companies 
involved. The amount each Constituent State is to receive from such 
distributed tax base would depend on the Constituent State’s GDP.108 
Constituent States with the lowest GDP would receive a greater proportion 
of the retained and redistributed tax base.109 
In an East African Federation context, this would mean that each of 
the Constituent States of the East African Federation would always receive 
a portion of the tax base collected through a system similar to the CCCTB. 
For example, where a group has located its factors in the Constituent 
States formerly known as Kenya and Uganda, the majority of the CCCTB 
tax base would be allocated to the Constituent States formerly known as 
Kenya and Uganda because they are the Constituent States housing the 
apportionment factors—let’s say an allocation of seventy per cent. The 
other thirty per cent of the tax base would accordingly be divided amongst 
all the Constituent States, with the lowest GDP-generating Constituent 
State receiving the largest portion of the redistributed thirty per cent tax 
base. Such redistribution would allow the less developed Constituent 
States, such as the Constituent States formerly known as South Sudan 
and Burundi, the opportunity and the means to catch up with the more 
developed Constituent States in the East African Federation.
In terms of the above discussion, it is envisaged that the total 
corporate income tax collected at the Federal Government level would be 
redistributed to the Constituent States. This is based on the understanding 
that the Federal Government would be funded by other taxes, such as 
personal income taxes, value-added tax and/or property taxes.
The East African Federation would not be hindered by some of the 
political sensitivities that surround the Member States. Therefore, it 
would be possible for it to implement a regime similar to the CCCTB 
in one phase and also to have the regime apply to all companies and 
permanent establishments within the East African Federation. Moreover, 
it is recommended that the East African Federation emulate the checks to 
107. Christian Kellerman, Thomas Rixen & Susanne Uhl, “Europeanizing Corporate Taxation 
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be built into the CCCTB regime, as proposed in the recommendations, to 
ensure that the CCCTB regime achieves the objectives it is intended to 
bring about. 
It is questionable whether the East African Federation should consider 
implementing the data factor and the concept of a digital permanent 
establishment. Such implementation would certainly place the Federation 
at the vanguard of navigating the digital economy and all its implications 
for the effective taxation of corporate profits. However, the author has 
some concern that including this digital component would complicate 
the implementation of a CCCTB regime to the extent that more resources 
would be devoted to the complexities of a CCCTB at the expense of 
implementing the simpler aspects well. The author therefore suggests that 
the East African Federation initially implement the three-factor formulary 
apportionment, with the digital components to be introduced later after it 
has settled into implementing and administering a CCCTB system. 
In making this suggestion, the author is aware of the growing 
importance of the service industry within the East African region and of the 
forecast that the service industry will constitute 51.3 per cent of the EAC’s 
GDP by 2050.110 The figures suggest that the East African Federation 
must therefore account for intangibles at some point. The author is of 
the view that notwithstanding the projected importance of intangibles 
to the East African Federation, it would have much more to gain from 
a prudent, staggered approach to a CCCTB regime implementation than 
an “everything-at-once” approach, for which the East African Federation 
may not yet have the institutional capacity to support.
The East African Federation should seriously consider implementing 
a regime similar to the CCCTB proposed in the EU. This implementation 
would allow the East African Federation to replace the varied corporate tax 
bases across the Partner States with a system that has some synergies with 
the existing corporate income tax bases of the Partner States, while allowing 
it to make some difficult decisions in reforming the corporate income tax 
regime in the Federation. It is encouraged that difficult decisions be made, 
such as substantially narrowing the number of capital and depreciation 
allowances on offer in the Partner States and implementing one corporate 
income tax rate. Overall, the CCCTB regime, even in its proposed form, 
holds a great deal of promise for the East African Federation.
110. East African Community, “East African Community Vision 2050: Regional Vision for Socio-
Economic Transformation and Development” (2015), online (pdf): EAC Information Repository 
<repository.eac.int/handle/11671/567> [http://hdl.handle.net11671/567].
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b. Attract foreign direct investment
Tax incentives
Tax incentives are commonly used in developing countries. The 
principal aim of these incentives is to attract foreign direct investment. 
However, there is great debate (and uncertainty) about whether tax 
incentives in fact serve to increase foreign direct investment and 
thereby increase economic growth.111
Despite the doubt in the true efficacy of tax incentives, tax incentives 
feature strongly in the tax policies of the EAC Partner States. Kenya offers 
corporate income tax holidays under both its Special Economic Zones Act 
(SEZ Act)112 and its Export Processing Zones Act (EPZ Act).113 Uganda 
offers exporters an exemption from income tax for a period of ten years if 
certain conditions are met, including that the exporter export at least eighty 
per cent of the completed goods.114 Rwanda offers a corporate income tax 
holiday in its headquarter company regime.115
Recommendations 
In light of the doubts as to whether tax incentives actually do bring in 
greater foreign direct investment, it is recommended that the East African 
Federation carefully consider whether to make use of tax incentives. 
In making this decision, it would be useful to evaluate whether the tax 
incentives used in the EAC Partner States were effective in meeting the 
objective of attracting foreign direct investment. This evaluation should 
weigh the incoming foreign direct investment against the cost of corporate 
income tax not collected from the qualifying taxpayers. 
In the event that such evaluation produces the decision that 
tax incentives should be used in the East African Federation, it is 
recommended that the East African Federation consider making use of tax 
111. Marios B Obwona, “Determinants of FDI and Their Impact on Economic Growth in Uganda” 
(2001) 13:1 African Development Rev 46 at 59; Rachel L Wellhausen, “Innovation in Tow: R&D FDI 
and Investment Incentives” (2013) 15:4 Bus & Politics 467; Franklin R Root & Ahmed A Ahmed, 
“The Influence of Policy Instruments on Manufacturing Direct Foreign Investment in Developing 
Countries” (1978) 9:3 J Intl Bus Studies 81; Alexander Klemm & Stefan Van Parys, Empirical 
Evidence on the Effects of Tax Incentives (2009) (IMF, 2009); Eric M Zolt, “Tax Incentives: Protecting 
the Tax Base” in Alexander Trepelkov, Harry Tonino & Dominika Halka, United Nations Handbook 
on Selected Issues in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries, 2nd ed (United Nations, 2015) 
451 at 452.
112. Special Economic Zones Act (Kenya), No 16 of 2015.
113. Export Processing Zones Act (Kenya), c 517.
114. Income Tax Act (Uganda), 1997, s 21(1)(y).
115. Law Nº 006/2021 Of 05/02/2021 on Investment Promotion and Facilitation (Rwanda), Annex 
item I. 
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credit accounts116 rather than the traditional tax holiday model. According 
to Tanzi and Zee, tax credit accounts grant each qualifying investor a set 
amount of tax relief, such as US$250 000 for example, against which 
such investor’s actual tax liability would be set off.117 For instance, in year 
one, after the investor files a tax return and its tax liability in that year 
amounts to US$50 000, the investor’s tax credit account would be reduced 
to US$200 000 for the subsequent years.118 This method allows for greater 
certainty for the taxpayer and the revenue service while also allowing for 
the tax incentive to be managed in an open and transparent manner.119 
Moreover, this method would allow the East African Federation to have a 
better sense of the exact cost of the corporate tax revenues it is losing to 
attract foreign direct investment.
Uganda has been monitoring some of its tax incentives on a basis 
similar to the tax credit account. In terms of section 166(2) of the Income 
Tax Act in Uganda, companies benefitting from tax holiday periods are 
nonetheless required to submit their tax computations as though they were 
not exempt from tax.120 The East African Federation would therefore be 
able to draw from the Ugandan experience in administering a tax credit 
account-like system.
It is also recommended that the East African Federation focus on 
creating non-tax reasons for investors to invest in the region. One of 
these non-tax reasons should include creating a favourable investment 
environment for investors, as it has been noted that such an environment 
is directly related to ensuring the efficacy of any tax incentives offered.121 
Moreover, the budget of the East African Federation should focus on 
building infrastructure while the executive should focus on relaxing the 
bureaucracy around conducting business in the region. A further means of 
attracting foreign investment is through making the capital market more 
open and allowing for a greater mobility of capital.122 Through a careful 
and targeted devotion of resources, the Federation could easily create an 
attractive destination for foreign investment—all without surrendering its 
tax base.
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c. Corporate income tax and the informal sector
The size of the informal sector or shadow economy is particularly 
problematic. A large informal sector has the effect of substantially 
narrowing the tax base to a small group of formal taxpayers.123 This, in 
turn, results in low income tax rates as the government fears that higher 
rates would force more taxpayers into the informal sector and out of 
the government’s range.124 A study conducted by Waseem indicates that 
informality remains one of the biggest barriers to emerging economies 
developing better fiscal capacity.125 According to Buehn et al, these large 
informal sectors in developing countries are the product of high tax 
burdens.126 
Mitra argues that there are two ways to reduce the size of a large 
informal sector: improve tax enforcement and increase the formal sector’s 
access to credit.127 Once the enforcement and administrative capacity 
of revenue authorities are significantly improved, Mitra argues that this 
corresponds to a significantly increased risk of errant taxpayers being 
caught and penalized.128 Similarly, greater access to quality sources of 
finance for the formal sector acts as an incentive for businesses to migrate 
from the informal to the formal sector.129 Mitra’s study also produces the 
interesting result that once these factors are present in the economy, the 
link between the raising of taxes and the rise of the informal sector is 
broken.130 These two factors therefore enable government to actually raise 
taxes without a consequent increase in the size of the informal sector.131 
Recommendations
In the light of the above discussion, the East African Federation would be 
well advised to devote resources towards the significant improvement of 
the administrative and enforcement capacity of its revenue authority. The 
East African Federation should also work towards improving the quality 
and capacity of the credit market and credit institutions. This could be done 
through making more government funding available for credit institutions 
and devoting more resources into developing the micro-lending market 
123. Mazhar Waseem, “Taxes, Informality and Income-Shifting: Evidence from a Recent Pakistani 
Tax” (2018) 157 J Public Economics 41.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid at 57. 
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127. Shalini Mitra, “To Tax or Not to Tax? When Does It Matter for Informality?” (2017) 64 Economic 
Modelling 117. 
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and suppliers within the East African region. In doing so, however, the 
East African Federation should not forget to also increase the regulation 
around the provision of credit so as to protect vulnerable debtors from 
unscrupulous debt-collection mechanisms. Should it devote the necessary 
resources in this targeted way, there is great potential for the Federation to 
substantially increase its corporate income tax collections. 
3. Administrative Capacity Issues
It is envisaged that administrative capacity within the East African region 
should improve once the formation of the Federation pools the government 
personnel. It is possible that some staff from one Partner State may be more 
expert in one area while others may be more expert in another. It would 
therefore be possible for internal training measures to be adopted to bring 
all government officials to a certain minimum level of expertise. Beyond 
that level, perhaps the East African Federation should consider bringing in 
experts to train staff. The OECD is also making “toolkits” available that 
may assist the East African Federation in developing its expertise in the 
relevant fields. 
Moreover, it is suggested that a central database of taxpayers be 
formed so that each Constituent State authority may have easy access 
to all relevant information pertaining to a taxpayer operating within its 
province. This database may include details of the taxpayer, including 
incorporation details, details of shareholders or owners and perhaps 
stakeholders, location of operations, history of filed tax returns, history 
of audits conducted and the outcomes thereof, and financial records of the 
taxpayer if available. This central database may also be used to coordinate 
audits across local government authorities regarding a taxpayer operating 
in more than one region. 
The formation of such a database would be facilitated by the East African 
Federation implementing the OECD’s BEPS Action 13, which requires 
Country-by-Country Reports to be filed by multinational enterprises 
operating across several jurisdictions.132 Moreover, the Federation should 
consider signing treaties that would facilitate cooperation amongst 
revenue authorities to access taxpayer information. Such treaties include 
Tax Exchange Information Agreements, DTAs, which include automatic 
exchange of information provisions, and the Multilateral Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,133 of which Kenya and 
Uganda are signatories. 
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In a similar fashion, the East African Federation should consider 
developing a protocol for the collection of taxes owed. This protocol should 
clearly set out the progression of tax collection methods to ensure that 
all taxpayers in the East African region are afforded the same treatment. 
Such progression may include notices of taxes due, the imposition of 
penalties and interest, the point at which judgment should be sought 
against a recalcitrant taxpayer, when garnishee orders should be sought, 
and when third parties (such as banks) may be enlisted to seize funds 
directly from taxpayer accounts. It is also suggested that such protocols 
be made publicly available so that taxpayers are aware of the collection 
mechanisms available to the East African Federation’s tax authority. 
It is further suggested that the East African Federation pass legislation 
specifically addressing the tax administration measures to be implemented 
within the region. This legislation should bear in mind that an appropriate 
balance should be sought between the rights of the taxpayer and that of the 
East African Federation’s revenue authority.
The process of building administrative capacity cannot be completed 
overnight, and the creation of a strong administrative network should 
remain a longstanding item on the agenda of the East African Federation.
Conclusion
For an African developing country to achieve its SDGs, it is vital that it 
mobilize domestic financial resources to finance the expenditure required 
to make the SDGs a reality. This paper argues that for the proposed East 
African Federation, corporate income tax may be a significant tool for 
acquiring such financial resources. 
This paper further argues that the corporate income tax system may 
significantly increase the financial resources of the EAC Partner States 
in three ways: (i) broadening the corporate income tax base according to 
the rules proposed in the EU’s CCTB/CCCTB proposal; (ii) effectively 
using tax incentives by identifying concrete objectives to be achieved and 
monitoring the revenues lost by implementing such incentives; and (iii) 
taking measures to reduce the large informal sector in the region through 
increasing access to finance for formal businesses and developing an 
effective tax administrative authority.  
Although premised on a fictional supranational organization, this 
paper has present-day value. It proposes how an African regional 
integration project may offer possible solutions to the rest of the world on 
how to successfully integrate several corporate income tax bases into one 
in Tax Matters: Amended by the 2010 Protocol (Paris: OECD, 2011).
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coherent and functioning tax base, while properly balancing policy with 
the real-world factors that influence its implementation. 
